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Abstract 
The housing market is both large and complex.  This paper develops a simple model that 
captures the essential features of the supply and demand for housing, and which is used 
to evaluate the impact of a range of policy interventions.  Increases in the stock of housing 
would reduce rents and house prices.  A reduction in tax concessions for landlords would 
raise rents and moderate house prices.  Additional subsidies for owner-occupancy would 
tend to reduce rents and raise house prices.  Significant reductions in rents and house 
prices would follow a fall in the cost of housing, through, for example lower regulatory and 
consent costs.  Falling real interest rates result in lower rents, higher house prices and 
lower owner-occupancy rates.  Despite the widespread attention owner-occupancy rates 
have attracted, the paper concludes that they are not a particularly helpful guide to the 
state of the housing market.  Typically they are quite insensitive to policy interventions, a 
result that follows from the integrated view of both the rental and ownership market, 
adopted in this study. 
   
JEL CLASSIFICATION  R21 Housing Demand 
R31 Housing Supply and Markets 
R38 Government Policies 
 
KEYWORDS  Housing markets; New Zealand; rental and owner-
occupancy; elasticities; rents; house prices; policy 
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A Simple Model of Housing Rental 
and Ownership with Policy 
Simulations  
1 Introduction 
The housing market is large.  In most countries it is a key component of investment and 
consumption expenditure.  In New Zealand, residential houses are a significant part of 
total infrastructure and residential investment is typically over a quarter of capital 
formation.  Rent paid to landlords is 5 to 6% of household expenditure, while imputed rent 
on owner occupied houses comprises 6 to 7% of household income.
1
  
It is a complex market.  Residential houses are long-lasting durable goods whose value is 
large compared to income.  Their expense and durability means a house is not usually 
paid for in full at the time of purchase.  Rather, houses are leased or paid off over long 
periods of time using sophisticated financial instruments.  For this reason, private 
landlords have an unusually large role in the market: in New Zealand, approximately 30% 
of houses are rented.  In addition, bank lending is dominated by advances against 
mortgages and housing features prominently in the retirement saving of many 
households. 
The market is further complicated because a set of wide-ranging government 
interventions influence the decisions of owner-occupiers and private landlords.  In most 
countries governments play a major role through their investment in and ownership of 
public housing, their involvement in financial markets, and through significant interventions 
via the taxation system and welfare programmes.  New Zealand is no exception.   
Furthermore, monetary policy is sometimes conducted with a conscious focus on 
outcomes in the housing market.
2
 
The complexity of the market means it is difficult to analyse the effect of different policy 
interventions without a model.  A model is needed because the long run responses to 
policy changes involve a number of feedback loops.  For example, an increase in the 
                                                                  
1   Between 2003 and 2007, residential housing comprised between 47 and 49 of the capital stock, and residential 
investment was 27-29 percent of gross capital formation. Imputed rent was 6-7 percent of total disposable income.  
2   See for example Alan Bollard and Chris Hunt (2008) “Coping with shocks - A New Zealand perspective.” A background 
paper prepared for an address to the Canterbury Employers’ Chamber of Commerce, Christchurch, 25 January. 
http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/speeches/3208927.html  
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number of new dwellings will increase the total stock of housing and result in lower prices 
(everything else equal).  Lower house prices will mean that some existing renters will be 
able to purchase a house, leading to an increase in the rate of owner occupied housing.  
However, potential investors in rental properties will also face lower house prices, and will 
find further investment profitable at existing rents.  This will drive down rents, leading to a 
decrease in the owner-occupancy rate as new households form.  The net effect on the 
owner-occupancy rate is ambiguous.  In general, the overall effect on various housing 
market variables can only be assessed using a consistent analytical framework, 
incorporating estimates of the essential behavioural parameters. 
To date, models that simultaneously capture the incentives facing home-owners, 
landlords, and developers have been large and extremely complicated.  The principal aim 
of this paper is to develop a simple model that, while abstracting from much of the 
complexity, captures the essential dual nature of housing as both a consumption good 
and an investment good.  The model incorporates owner-occupiers, a rental sector, and a 
construction sector.   
The second aim of the paper is to analyse the effects of different policy options.   
Examples include policies that lower the marginal costs of housing (eg, through changes 
to regulation of land use, consent processes and building codes); policies that support the 
demand for housing (eg, housing related welfare payments); policies that influence the 
demand for home ownership through taxes and subsidies (eg, changes in the taxation of 
investment income from rental housing); and policies that change the cost of mortgage 
finance.  The model is used to simulate how house prices, rents, and the quantity of 
rented and owner occupied houses are affected by these different policy interventions.  In 
turn, these variables can be used to calculate the owner-occupancy rate.
3
  In each case 
the long run (equilibrium) state of the housing market is calculated.  The model is silent on 
the dynamic adjustment path that house prices might take in moving from one state to 
another in response to a policy change.  
The analytical approach developed here can be used to guide policy formation in two 
ways.  First, it indicates the scale of the change in a policy instrument that may be needed 
to achieve a given target level of an outcome variable in the housing market.  For 
example, a policy analyst might wish to ask how much new dwelling construction would be 
needed to generate a rise of five percentage points in the owner-occupancy rate.   
Secondly, it can provide insights into the confidence that can be placed on these 
estimates by indicating how the answers depend on the various parameters in the model.  
To this end, we show how some results are indeed sensitive to a range of values for key 
parameters. 
The paper is structured as follows.  In the following section we provide a brief synoptic 
view of a selected section of the literature on modelling the housing sector.  Section 3 
presents a graphical representation while Section 4 sets out the formal derivation of the 
model.  This is followed by a discussion of the parameterisation (Section 5) and the policy 
simulations (Section 6).  After a consideration of the robustness of the findings (Section 
7), the paper concludes with a discussion and conclusions (Section 8).  Additional details 
of the modelling are presented in two appendices. 
                                                                  
3  
We adhere to the term “owner occupied” rate rather than the more commonly used home ownership rate. The latter 
must, by definition, always be 100% as all homes must be owned.
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2 Existing  studies 
There is a vast literature on the economics of housing, and a wide range of models of the 
housing sector have been developed.  These can be broadly characterised as models 
which focus on a particular aspect of the market (eg, the demand for rental housing, 
tenure, or hedonic price measures), and large scale, relatively complex, simulation 
models.   
Examples of the first type abound.  Recent work includes models of the tenure choice of 
young households (Haurin, Hendershott et al 1996); models that incorporate spatial 
effects (Glaeser and Gyourko 2007); models of spatial and temporal influences on house 
price formation (Hwang and Quigley 2008); models that measure demand responses 
(Khaled and Lattimore 2008); models of the impact of the taxation of landlords (Wood and 
Kemp 2003); and models of the effect of supply restrictions (Grimes and Aitken 2004, 
2006). 
A number of large scale simulation models have been built.  Notable among these are 
Meen and Andrew (2008) for the UK, and Wood, Watson et al (2003) for Australia.  The 
UK model allows for population growth, different types of households, household 
formation, tenure choice, interregional migration, housing supply and earnings.  The 
model can be used to simulate the effect of changes in policies such as an increase in the 
supply of land for new construction.  The Australian Housing Market Microsimulation 
(AHMM) model captures the housing supply and demand decisions of consumers and 
investors and allows for the effect of taxation.  Policies such as a grant to first home 
buyers or changes to the depreciation allowances for new construction can be assessed 
for their impact on tenure choice and home ownership rates.  The model captures the 
effect of government interventions on incomes, costs and prices paid by decision makers 
on both the demand and supply side of the housing market.  
Like these large models, the model in this paper is designed to capture the fundamental 
economics of the housing market.  By allowing for a range of feedback effects, it allows 
the analysis of the impact of policy changes or other externally imposed shocks on the 
long run level of prices and quantities.  The model provides a more general and integrated 
view of the housing market than many other “single issue” models, while avoiding the very 
substantial resource costs of building and maintaining a large scale simulation model. 
The model is most closely related to small scale models of the housing sector that 
incorporate renters and owners.  An example is the paper by Abelson and Joyeux (2007).  
They developed a model that specifically addressed the effect of taxes and subsidies in 
the housing market, recognising both an ownership and rental sector.  However, their 
model does not allow for the full range of feedback effects from an initial exogenous 
shock.  For example, they do not allow for shifts in the demand for owner occupied 
houses when they analyse the effect of a tax or subsidy to investors in rental property, nor 
do they permit the total supply of housing to vary.  The model we develop here relaxes 
these restrictions and allows for a full range of feedback effects from any exogenous 
change in the housing market.    
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3  A graphical representation 
In Figure 1 we provide a four quadrant graphical representation of the basic relationships.  
This particular form allows us to represent simultaneously the four key endogenous 
variables of interest: the price of houses,
H P , rents 
R P , the quantity of rental houses, 
R Q , 
and the total quantity of houses, 
T Q .  
We assume all houses are identical so that there is a single price of housing and a single 
rental rate.  Clearly this assumption is counterfactual.  Nonetheless, it may not be as 
restrictive as it first seems.  Many of the results derived using these assumptions can be 
interpreted as the demand for standardised housing units which have incorporated an 
adjustment for quality.  Floor area would be one such simple adjustment. 
A convenient starting point is in the north-east quadrant where we depict the supply of 
rental housing ()
R S  and the demand for rental housing ()
R D  as functions of the rent.  
Both these relationships are drawn for an initial price of houses (denoted 0
H P ).  As we 
show subsequently, changes in the price of houses will result in shifts in the demand and 
supply of rental housing, as distinct from movements along the demand and supply 
curves.  In addition, the supply function for rental housing has as arguments real interest 
rates () r  and taxes on income derived from rental property () t .  The demand function for 
rental property has as shifters the real interest rate () r , real incomes () Y  and a variable 
to capture the effect of subsidies to owner-occupancy () τ , the total demand.   
The downward sloping rental demand curve ()
R D  comes about through three distinct 
effects.  In the first instance, a rise in rents will encourage renters to economise on rental 
space by having more individuals share a dwelling; this is an “intensification effect”.   
Second, higher rents will slow down the rate at which new households form and enter the 
rental market; this is a “formation effect”.  Treating household formation as endogenous is 
critical to developing a full understanding of the effect of policy changes (Börsch-Supan 
1986).  Finally there is a “substitution effect”: as rents rise for a given price of houses, 
some existing renters will choose to become home owners. 
To satisfy the long run equilibrium market clearing condition in the rental market, the 
quantity of houses demanded for rental must be equal to the total quantity of rental 
housing supplied by investors.  The intersection of the supply and demand curves for 
rental housing simultaneously sets the market clearing rent (denoted 0
R P ), and the quantity 
of rental housing ()
R Q . 
The demand curve 
T D in the north-east quadrant represents the total demand for 
housing.  The curve traces out the demand for housing as rent varies, for a fixed level of 
house prices.  The demand for housing is made up of the demand by renters and the 
demand by home owners.  It is deliberately drawn steeper than the rental demand curve 
to reflect the way that substitution between renting and ownership is netted out at the level 
of total housing demand.  The total demand for housing is also a function of the real 
interest rate () r , real incomes () Y , and subsidies to owner-occupancy () τ . 
The supply of housing is drawn as a function of house prices in the south-east quadrant, 
denoted  ()
T SC , where C  denotes costs of constructing additional housing units.  For 
ease of illustration we will assume the supply of housing is initially fixed (ie, the supply 
curve is vertical at a given quantity).  In the more general case, however, the supply of  
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housing would be an upward sloping function of house prices; other things equal we 
would expect higher house prices to induce an increase in supply.  
The south-east quadrant also displays the demand for housing curve.  Each point on this 
curve corresponds to the level of total demand ()
T D  when the rental market (as shown in 
the north-east quadrant) is in equilibrium.  It has the standard downward slope of a 
demand function: at lower house prices, a greater quantity of housing is demanded. 
Figure 1: Prices and quantities in the housing market 
 
The initial equilibrium position in the housing market occurs at a price that equates the 
supply and demand for housing in the south-east quadrant.  When the three curves in the 
north-east quadrant are drawn incorporating this housing price, the equilibrium rent is 
shown  0 ()
R P .  In the north-west quadrant, the intersection point marked 0 X corresponds to 
the equilibrium values of the house price  0 ()
H P  and the rental price  0 ()
R P .
 
The graphical model can now be used to illustrate a change in policy settings (Figure 2 
and Figure 3).  To illustrate this, we use the case of a “tax” on investors in rental housing.  
This could take the form of a capital gains tax or a limitation on deducting losses from 
other sources of taxable income (the so-called “ring-fencing” strategy). 
The initial impact is denoted by an increase in the “tax” effect on the supply of rental 
housing (shown as an increase from  0 t  to  1 t  in Figure 2).  This moves the rental supply 
curve upward in the north-east quadrant.  This movement corresponds to the assumption 
that the profitability of rental housing would be reduced by the tax for any given rental 
price, and hence the amount of housing offered for rent by investors would be reduced.  
To re-establish equilibrium in the rental market, leaving house prices unchanged, requires 
an increase in rents from their initial level of  0
R P to a new higher level of 1
R P . 
Further responses to the initial policy change are shown in Figure 3 which is a 
continuation of Figure 2.  When the stock of housing is fixed, the inward shift in demand 
will lead to a lower price of housing  2 ()
H P .  However, there are further adjustments in the  
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rental market following this decline in house prices.  At any given rent, landlords will be 
prepared to offer a greater supply of houses.  This shifts the rental supply curve to the 
right in the NE quadrant.  At the same time the lower house price makes ownership more 
attractive than renting so that the demand for rent will contract at any rent level.  This 
shifts the rental demand curve to the left in the NE quadrant.   
The consequences of these moves on the supply and demand for rental properties is that 
a new equilibrium rent  2
R P  is reached, which is unambiguously lower than  1 ()
R P .  At this 
point, the rental and owner occupied markets will be in a new equilibrium position.  The 
effect of the “tax” on rental property will be to lower the price of houses and raise rents, 
while at the same time increasing home ownership rates.   
To this point, we have assumed the initial price of housing is unchanged.  However, the 
change in rents leads to a contraction in demand in the NE quadrant.  This reduction in 
demand at the initial price level corresponds to an inward shift of the demand curve in the SE 
quadrant.  At every house price the total quantity demand will be lower due the higher rents.   
Figure 2: The effect of a policy change on the housing market 
 
This decrease in the total demand for housing occurs because the increase in rents 
causes households to economise on rental space, all else equal.  This comes about 
through two avenues.  In the first place, the average number of occupants per rental unit 
tends to rise.  Second, some people who might have entered the rental market are 
discouraged by the rise in rents and remain in the house where they are currently living.  
In other words there is both an intensity effect and a formation effect.  The magnitudes of 
these two effects determine how the demand for rental housing (and hence the total 
demand for housing) responds to changes in house prices and rents. 
The intersection of the new equilibrium prices  2
H P and  2
R P is shown by the point X1 in the 
north-west quadrant.  There is a curve denoted LL which traces out the locus of the 
equilibrium prices for rent and houses.  In the case of an increase in the tax on rental 
property, the locus slopes upward to the right as rents rise and house prices fall.  Other  
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policies may well result in different changes to the two equilibrium prices and would 
therefore trace out different loci. 
Figure 3: The effect of a policy change on the housing market (contd.) 
 
This example has focussed on the situation in which the stock of housing is fixed.  This 
corresponds to the short run, a period in which changes in policy do not induce a 
response in the total supply of houses given the lags involved in the preparation of new 
sites, the obtaining of permits and the construction itself.   
What happens in the longer term when the supply can adjust?  Following a policy change 
such as a tax on rental property, the fall in house prices would be muted as the quantity of 
houses decreases.
4
  In fact, in the extreme case when the supply curve is infinitely elastic, 
shifts in the demand for housing have no effect on house prices as additional houses can 
be added at the existing costs of land and construction.  In this case, the final equilibrium 
in Figure 3 occurs at rents  2
R P and house prices  2
H P : the increase in taxes causes rents to 
rise, the quantity of rental houses to fall, and the total quantity of houses to fall.   
Homeownership rates increase, although this occurs at the expense of less 
accommodation overall.  Clearly, this is the upper bound and in reality we would expect 
the outcome to be an intermediate case, where there is some decline in house prices and 
some decline in the total stock of housing. 
The diagrams are useful as a guide to the workings of the model and to indicate the direction 
of changes in prices and quantities that could be expected following a change of policy.   
However, the magnitude of any changes is arguably of equal or greater interest.  Would rents 
rise by 1% or 20%?  Would house prices fall 2% or 10%?  To calculate the magnitude of 
changes, we require a formal statement of the model in a form that can be used to derive 
numerical estimates.  The next section sets out the model. 
                                                                  
4  
The supply of houses would be allowed to contract through depreciation
.   
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4  The Model  
The following model of the housing market calculates the equilibrium level of housing 
quantities, prices and rents as a function of various exogenous factors such as 
construction costs, interest rates, subsidies and taxes.  
The model comprises four basic supply and demand functions:  
(i)  the demand to rent housing; 
(ii)  the demand to own housing;  
(iii)  the supply of housing for rent; 
(iv)  the total supply of housing. 
The five endogenous variables for which the model solves are: 
(i)  the price to rent a house ()
R P ; 
(ii)  the purchase price of a house ()
H P ; 
(iii)  the number of houses that are rented ()
R Q ; 
(iv)  the number of houses that are owned by owner-occupiers  ()
O Q ; and 
(v)  the total number of houses ()
T RO QQQ =+ . 
The last equation simply states that all houses are rented or owner occupied.  Each of the 
four basic equations is specified in terms of prices and a set of exogenous variables.  We 
now describe each equation in turn. 
4.1  Demand to rent houses 
(, , , , )
R D RRH QD P Pr Y τ =     (1) 
The demand to rent houses ()
RD Q  depends on the rent ()
R P , the price of owning a 
house  ()
H P , any additional government subsidies to assist home purchase by owner-
occupiers () τ , the interest rate () r , and mean household income () Y
5
.   
We assume:  
0
RR DP ∂∂ < :  as rents increase, demand for rental property decreases. 
0
RH DP ∂∂> :   as house prices increase, demand to rent increases. 
0
R D τ ∂∂ < :   as subsidies for ownership increase, demand to rent decreases.   
0
R Dr ∂∂ > :    as interest rates increase, demand to rent increases. 
0
R DY ∂∂ > :   as mean incomes increase, demand to rent increases. 
                                                                  
5   In the formulation of the model that follows we have assumed real incomes are constant.  The model could easily be 
generalised to allow for changes in real incomes.
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It is possible that the partial derivatives of the rental demand equation vary considerably 
with rents and prices.  This is because renting a house and owning a house are close 
substitutes for many people, so small changes in rents, prices or interest rates may lead 
to sizeable changes in ownership patterns.  
4.2   Demand to own houses  
(, , , , )
OO R H QD P P r Y τ =  (2) 
The demand to own houses depends on the rent, the price of owning a house, any 
subsidies to owner occupiers, the interest rate, and income.   
In particular, we assume:    
0
OR DP ∂∂ > :   as rents increase, demand to own houses increases. 
0
OH DP ∂∂ < :   as house prices increase, demand to own decreases. 
0
O D τ ∂∂ > :   as subsidies for ownership increase, demand to own increases. 
0
O Dr ∂∂ < :  as interest rates increase, demand to own decreases. 
0
O DY ∂∂ > :   as incomes increase, demand to own increases. 
4.3  Total demand for houses 
(, , , , )
TD T R H QD P PY r τ =  (3) 
The demand to own and rent are substitutes with partial derivatives of opposing sign. We 
assume that the total demand for housing is less elastic with respect to the price of 
houses than either the demand to own or the demand to rent, as these are substitutes for 
each other.    
Spefically:    
0
TR DP ∂∂ < :  as rents increase, total demand for houses decreases. 
0
TH DP ∂∂< :  as house prices increase, total demand decreases. 
0
T D τ ∂∂ > :  as subsidies for ownership increase, total demand increases. 
0
T Dr ∂∂ < :   as interest rates increase, total demand decreases. 
0
T DY ∂∂ > :   as incomes increase, total demand increases.  
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4.4  Supply of houses for rent 
(, , , )
RS R R R H QG S P P r t =+  (4) 
The supply of houses for rent comprises the government supply 
R G  plus the private 
supply (, , , )
RRH SPPr t , where t is a measure of the tax on income derived from leasing 
residential property. We assume the government supply is determined exogenously. The 
decision to become a private landlord will depend on the relative returns of investing in 
housing versus other asset types.  For a given price and interest rate, an increase in rents 
makes investment in housing relatively more attractive.   
We assume a tax on leased residential property reduces the willingness of landlords to 
invest in housing.  In practice, the tax on leased residential property is lower than the tax 
on some other classes of investments such as interest earning loans, as various tax 
concessions exist.  For example, in New Zealand tax is not paid on capital appreciation 
whereas income tax is paid on the inflation component of interest earnings.  In the 
remainder of the paper we primarily analyse the effect of increasing the tax concession on 
residential property earnings, rather than the effect of increasing the tax on residential 
property earnings.  The value of the tax concession to residential property investors 
increases if there is an increase in the inflation rate or in general income tax rates, as 
capital gains on residential property are not taxed.
6
  
We assume:    
0
RR SP ∂∂≥ :    as rents increase, willingness to supply rentals increases. 
0
RH SP ∂∂≤ :   as prices increase, willingness to supply rentals decreases. 
0
R Sr ∂∂ ≤ :     as interest rates rise, willingness to supply rentals decreases. 
0
R St ∂∂ < :  as taxes increase, willingness to supply rentals decreases. 
4.5  Total supply of houses 
(, )
TS T T H QG S P C =+  (5) 
The total supply of houses comprises those built by the government 
T G  plus those built 
by the private sector.  The level of government construction is assumed to be determined 
exogenously.  The private supply of houses depends on the price 
H P  and construction 
costs,  C .  Construction costs include the cost of developing land, the cost of building 
materials, labour, and regulatory costs.  We examine the supply response over two 
different time horizons.  In the short term, supply is assumed to be perfectly inelastic 
(0 )
TH SP ∂∂= ; but in the long term, an increase in prices results in an increase in the 
number of houses (0 )
TH SP ∂∂> . 
                                                                  
6   In this paper we have not directly modelled the process by which inflation causes property price appreciation, although 
we do analyse the consequences of an increase the value of the tax concession because of an increase in the inflation 
rate.
  
WP 09/05  A SIMPLE MODEL OF HOUSING RENTAL AND OWNERSHIP WITH 
POLICY SIMULATIONS  11
 
Market clearing conditions 
There are two market clearing conditions.  First, the supply of rental housing equals the 
demand for rental housing:  
1(, , , , , ,) (, , , , ) (, , , , ) 0
RH R R RRH RRH F P P trYG G S P P trY D P P Yr ττ =+ − =  (6) 
Secondly, the total supply of housing equals the total demand for housing: 
2(, , , , , ,) (, ) (, , , , ) 0
RH T T TH TRH FP P r Y C G G S P C DP P Y r ττ =+ − =  (7) 
In equilibrium, there is a pair of values of rent (
R P ) and prices (
H P ) that are consistent 
with equations (6) and (7).  These values are functions of the sets of exogenous variables.   





















 and  x is a vector of the exogenous variables. 
The implicit function theorem can be used to derive the relationship between rents and 
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=− ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂∂ − ∂∂ ∂∂ − ∂∂ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (9) 
or 
1[] x Px PF F
− =− . 
Price effects of the exogenous variables  
Equation 10 describes the effect on prices and rents of changes in the level of 
government ownership (
R G  and 
T G ), taxes on landlords () t , home-owner subsidies () τ , 
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⎡⎤ ∂∂∂∂ ∂∂∂∂∂∂ ∂∂∂∂
= ⎢⎥ ∂∂∂∂ ∂∂ ∂∂∂∂∂∂ ∂∂ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ∂∂ − ∂∂ ∂∂ − ∂∂− ∂∂
− ⎢⎥ −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ −∂ ∂ −∂ ∂ ⎣⎦
(10) 
Note that in the short run 0
T SC ∂∂ = .  
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Q α = be the fraction of houses owned by the government (approximately 
0.05). 
Then equation (10) can be converted into elasticities as follows:  
1 00 ( )
0 0
PR P PR P PR P PR P PR P PR P PR P
GR GT t C r Y
PH PH PH PH PH PH PH
GR GT t C r Y
Q SR Q DR Q SR DR Q DR G
tr r Y









αε αε α ε ε αε α





⎡ ⎤ −− −
⎡⎤ − ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ −− − ⎣ ⎦
(12) 
Appendix A sets out the predicted signs of the elasticities of rents ()
R P  and house prices 
()
H P  with respect to the exogenous variables.  
The response of rents and house prices to changes in incomes, taxes, interest rates, 
subsidies, construction costs and the quantity of government owned houses can be 
calculated using equations (8) to (12).  To do this, however, we must first establish values 
for the elasticities involved on the right hand side of these equations.  Estimates are 
presented in the next section.  
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5 Parameter  estimates 
Table 1 displays the assumed values of the underlying elasticities.  The first entry is for 
the elasticity of supply of rental housing with respect to the price of rents (denoted in 
equation (12) as 
SR
pr ε ).  It has been assigned a value of 1, implying that a 10% increase in 
the price of rents would induce a 10% increase in the supply of rental housing.  The 
values in the table should be taken as reasonable “guesstimates” consistent with the 
literature on housing.
7
  In Section 7 we illustrate the extent to which our results are 
sensitive to changes in the values of these parameters. 
The elasticities of the total demand for housing with respect to rents and house prices are 
assumed to be small, -0.2 and –0.1 respectively.  The latter value implies a 10% increase 
in house prices reduces total demand for housing by 1%. While these numbers are small, 
they appear broadly consistent with New Zealand macroeconomic data, for over the last 
four decades New Zealand has experienced large variations in real house prices but only 
very small changes in per capita housing stocks (see the discussion in Appendix B).   
These elasticities are smaller than estimates for New Zealand recently made by Khaled 
and Lattimore (2008) using household budget data.  Their estimate of the own price 
elasticity of demand for housing is -0.44.  It is not entirely clear how to reconcile these 
numbers.  However, in our model there is no allowance for quality changes, whereas the 
actual data used by Khaled and Lattimore will capture how price changes lead to changes 
in the size of houses, or to improvements to existing houses.  In contrast, our elasticity 
only refers to the number of houses. 
Table 1: Values assigned to the basic parameters of the model 
 
 










Total supply of 
housing 
Rent 1.0  -2.0  -0.2   
House price  -1.0  1.0  -0.1  0 or 0.5 or ∞ 
Tax concession to landlords  -1.0       
Subsidy to ownership    -1.0  0.1   
Interest rate  -1.0  1.0  -0.1   
                                                                  
7   For a summary of empirical studies that estimate a range of elasticities for OECD countries see(Girouard, Kennedy et al 
2006).  
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6 Results 
Using the baseline set of elasticity assumptions set out in Table 1, we calculate the 
response of rents, house prices, and the quantity of houses to five different policy 
changes or shocks to the housing market.  In addition, we calculate the new owner-
occupancy rate.  (The owner-occupancy rate is always equal to 70% before the shock.)  
Table 2: Description of the changes in the policy simulations 
Exogenous variables 
changed in the policy 
simulations 
Description of the change 
A.  A 0.5% change in the 
stock of housing 
A 0.5% increase in the total stock of housing is equivalent to a 10% increase in the stock of 
government owned housing, or 7,500 houses. 
B.  A 10% change in the 
tax concession for 
landlords (t ) 
The subsidy to landlords is made up principally of the non-taxation of capital gains, 
estimated as 1.5% of the value of the house per annum.  This is about 30% of the assumed 
total real return to landlords of 5.0%.  A 10% increase would imply this rises by 0.15% from 
1.5 to 1.65%.  so total returns would increase to 5.15%, equivalent to a 3% increase in total 
returns.(a) 
C.  A 10% change in the 
subsidies to owner-
occupancy (τ ) 
Total subsidies to home owners, comprising principally of the non-taxation of imputed rents, 
increase by 10%.  This is computed as the product of the average owner’s equity share and 
the marginal rate of tax, giving an initial estimate of 16% of the cost of financing.  A 10% 
increase in the subsidy implies a rise from 16.0 to 17.6%.(a) 
D.  A 10% change in the 
cost of constructing 
houses (C ) 
The cost of building a house, including the land, increases by 10%. 
E.  A 10% change in the 
mortgage interest rate 
(r ) 
The mortgage interest rate increase by 10%; for example from 8.0 to 8.8%. 
(a)  See Appendix B for further details 
Each shock represents a 10% change in one of the exogenous variables.  The shocks are 
changes in (i) the stock of housing, (ii) the tax concession to landlords, (iii) the subsidies 
to owner-occupancy, (iv) the cost of constructing a house, and (v) the interest rate.  The 
description of each of the changes is given in Table 2. 
The results, set out in Table 3, are calculated for three values of the housing supply 
elasticity that reflect three ways that the supply of housing could respond to an increase in 
house prices.  In the first case, it is assumed that the elasticity equals zero, and total 
supply of housing is fixed.  This corresponds to the short run (1 to 2 years), when it is 
assumed that there is no significant change in the total supply due to lags in the planning, 
consenting and building process.  In the second case, the elasticity is 0.5.  This 
corresponds to the medium term, when there is a supply response to a price increase.  In 
the third case the elasticity is infinity.  This corresponds to the long run, when any change 
in demand is met by sufficient additional supply to hold prices constant.  In this case the 
price of houses is only determined by the cost of land and construction costs.  The cases 
of inelastic supply (the very short run) and infinitely elastic supply (the very long run) can 
be regarded as the bounds on the responses of rents and house prices to economic 
shocks.  
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Percentage change in a specified 
variable: 
Responsiveness of the total supply of housing to changes in house 
prices 













A.  The response to an increase in the stock of housing 
Rents -1.3  -0.4  0.0 
House prices  -2.3  -0.7  0.0 
Quantity of rental units  0.3  0.1  0.0 
Quantity of total housing  0.5  0.2  0.0 
Resulting rate of owner-occupancy  70.05  70.02  70.00 
B.  The response to an increase in the tax concession to landlords 
Rents -0.3  -0.5  -0.6 
House prices  0.6  0.2  0.0 
Quantity of rental units  1.19  1.25  1.28 
Quantity of total housing  0.00  0.09  0.13 
Resulting rate of owner-occupancy  69.64  69.65  69.66 
C. The response to an increase in the subsidy to owner-occupancy 
Rents 0.1  -0.5  -0.85 
House prices  1.7  0.5  0.0 
Quantity of rental units  -0.55  -0.38  -0.30 
Quantity of total housing  0.0  0.26  0.37 
Resulting rate of owner-occupancy  70.17  70.19  70.20 
D.  The response to an increase in the cost of constructing a house 
Rents 0.0  4.0  5.7 
House prices  0.0  7.1  10.0 
Quantity of rental units  0.0  -1.04  -1.49 
Quantity of total housing  0.0  -1.50  -2.15 
Resulting rate of owner-occupancy  70.0  69.65  69.76 
E.  The response to an increase in real interest rates 
Rents 0.3  4.6  6.4 
House prices  -10.6  -3.2  0.0 
Quantity of rental units  -1.19  -2.29  -2.77 
Quantity of total housing  0.0  -1.59  -2.28 
Resulting rate of owner-occupancy  70.36  70.21  70.15 
The three cases for the elasticity of supply do not imply a dynamic response in the sense 
that the market would evolve through these stages if a shock occurred.  Rather, the model 
is based on comparative static positions.  The results for the inelastic supply case give the 
equilibrium values of the endogenous variables (prices and quantities) that would occur in 
the long run if the supply were inelastic.  The same equilibrium interpretation is 
appropriate for the other two cases we present.  Provided this caveat is kept in mind it will 
be convenient to refer to the three cases as the short, medium and long run.  
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The results are used to calculate the size of the policy change or shock that is necessary 
to increase the owner-occupancy rate by 1 percentage point in the medium term.  In some 
cases, the results appear quite fanciful, because some policies have only tiny effects on 
the owner-occupancy rate even though they can have large effects on other aspects of 
the housing market such as the total quantity of housing.  These results suggest that the 
owner-occupancy rate is, in many respects, a poor indicator of the welfare consequence 
of housing policies. 
6.1  An increase in housing supply 
Section A of Table 3 shows the effects of the government increasing the total stock of 
housing by 0.5%, equivalent to about 7,500 additional houses, or 10% of the government 
stock.  In the short run, the increased stock of houses would reduce rents and house 
prices by an estimated 1.3% and 2.3% respectively (see the top left hand cells of Table 3) 
thus improving affordability for both buyers and renters, other things constant.  In contrast, 
in the long run case (with perfectly elastic supply) the government building programme 
has no effect on prices or quantities as the public investment merely crowds out private 
investment and the total supply of housing is unchanged (see the third column of Table 3).  
Only the relative proportions of public and privately constructed housing are altered.   
In the medium term, the increase in the stock of housing has very little effect on the 
owner-occupancy rate: it increases from 70 to 70.02%.  The increase is tiny for two 
reasons.  First, there is an offsetting reduction in private sector construction, so that the 
total stock of houses increases by less than the number of houses the government builds.  
Second, rents as well as house prices fall, so many of the new houses are occupied by 
tenants as the low rents induce new households to form.  These figures suggest that to 
increase the owner-occupancy rate by 1% it would be necessary for the government to 
build houses equal to 25% of the initial stock (375,000 houses) - a clearly fanciful number.  
If it were to do this, rents would fall by 20%, house prices would fall by 35%, the number 
of rental units would increase by 5%, and the total stock of houses would increase by 
10%.  Put another way, a building programme of this size would have enormous effects 
on the housing market, but very little effect on the owner-occupancy rate.  The owner-
occupancy rate is the wrong way of measuring the impact of this policy, because it misses 
the extent to which the number of households increases to take advantage of the lower 
rents and house prices.  
A variant of this scenario is for the government to build the additional houses and then 
retain them as rental units.
8
  This would be equivalent to the case where the Housing New 
Zealand Corporation owned and managed an increased stock of social housing.  The 
short run increase in the supply of rental housing would result in a fall in rents of 1.6% (in 
contrast to the initial case of 1.3%), and a fall in house prices of 1.6% (instead of 2.3%).  
In other words, the drop in house prices is moderated in the event these units are not put 
up for sale to the private sector.  In the long run case there is still no effect on rents and 
prices but the additional rental properties owned by the government would, other things 
equal, lower the owner-occupancy rate. 
                                                                  
8  These results, not reported in detail here, are available on request.
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6.2  An increase in the tax concession to landlords 
Under the existing tax regime, there are two principal concessions made to landlords.  In 
the first instance, landlords typically do not pay tax on capital appreciation.  If there is 
inflation, investors in leased residential property have a tax advantage over investors who 
simply invest in interest-bearing accounts, in which the inflation component of interest 
earnings is subject to tax.  When the inflation rate is 3%, this tax advantage is worth 1.5% 
of the value of the property.  This has the effect of making investment in rental property 
more attractive than would otherwise be the case.  Furthermore, those who have some 
debt financing have the opportunity to reduce their tax liability by offsetting any interest 
payments associated with the rental property against other sources of income.   
A 10% increase in tax concessions to landlords is worth 0.15% of the value of the property 
(ie, 10% of 1.5%).  If the total real return to property investors (rent plus capital 
appreciation) is assumed to be 5% in the long run, the increase in the tax concession 
increases the total yield by 3%, from 5 to 5.15%.  In the short run, an increase in the tax 
concession received by landlords leads to a 1.2% increase in the quantity of properties for 
rent, lowering rents by 0.3% and increasing house prices by 0.6%.  In the long run, the 
quantity of properties for rent increases by a similar amount, but house prices are 
unchanged and rents fall by 0.6%.  In all cases the effect of increasing the tax concession 
is to shift the tenure mix towards a lower proportion of owner-occupancy and a higher 
proportion of renting.  In the medium term scenario, the effect of the increase in the tax 
concession is to lower the owner-occupancy rate from 70 to 69.65%. 
These figures suggest that it would be necessary to reduce the size of the tax concession 
by 29% in order to increase the owner-occupancy rate by 1% in the medium term, that is 
from 1.5% of the value of the property to 1.1% of the value of the property, or by 
approximately $1,200 per year per property.  A reduction of this size could be achieved by 
increasing the amount of tax paid by landlords or by lowering the inflation rate from 3% 
per annum to 2%.  If the tax concession was reduced by this amount, rents would 
increase by 1.5%, house prices would decrease by 0.6%, the quantity of rented homes 
would decline by 3.6%, and the total quantity of houses would decline by 0.25%, 
equivalent to some 4,000 houses.  The increase in owner-occupancy rates and the 
increase in the welfare of those who buy would therefore come at the expense of a 
decrease in the welfare of those who rent.  The results in the long run case are similar 
except house prices do not decrease.   
6.3  An increase in subsidies to owner-occupancy 
There is an extensive range of subsidies to home ownership, both indirect and explicit.  
Indirect subsidies are delivered by the tax system through the exemption of imputed rents 
from taxation (although the inability to deduct mortgage-interest payments has to be set 
against this).  The government offers inducements to home ownership through such 
programmes as Welcome Home, a recently introduced shared equity scheme (essentially 
an interest-free second mortgage) and through the first home deposit subsidies for eligible 
households linked to KiwiSaver.  We estimate these subsidies reduce the financing cost 
of owning a home (the real interest rate multiplied by the price of a house) by 16%, or 
approximately $2,500 per year.
9
  A 10% increase in the value of the subsidies (compared 
                                                                  
9   At 5% real interest rates, the financing cost of owning a $300,000 home is $15,000 per year. $2,500 is 16% of this 
amount.  The
 
benefit disproportionately goes to those who own their own home outright.
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with no subsidies) therefore reduces the financing cost of owning a home by 17.6% (ie, 
16% * 1.1). 
In the short run a 10% increase in the subsidy will increase the demand for housing, and 
house prices will be driven up, by 1.7%.  In effect, a part of any subsidy is capitalised into 
house prices.  The higher house prices lead to a modest increase in rents, by 0.1%, and a 
0.55% decline in the quantity of rented housing.  The net effect is to raise the rate of 
owner-occupancy from 70 to 70.17%.  In the long run, there is no effect on house prices, 
as more houses are constructed in response to the higher demand.  In this case, the 
ownership subsidies lead to a 0.85% reduction in rents (due to the lower demand), and a 
0.13% increase in the total quantity of housing.  The effect on the owner-occupancy rate is 
similar to the short run case.  
These figures imply that to increase the owner-occupancy rate by 1% in the medium term, 
it would be necessary to increase the subsidy to home-owners by 53%.  This would be 
equivalent to approximately $1,250 per owner-occupier household per year.  This would 
have the additional effect of lowering rents by 2.6%, increasing house prices by 2.6%, 
lowering the quantity of rental accommodation by 2%, and increasing the total quantity of 
houses by 1.4%.  The results in the perfectly elastic case are similar, except there is no 
change in house prices and a larger increase in the housing stock.  
6.4  Increase in the cost of constructing a house 
The cost of a house reflects three major components: the land, the materials and labour 
input, and the costs of the regulatory regime and consent process.  Suppose there is a 
10% increase in the cost of a house from any one (or combination) of these elements.  In 
the short run, with an inelastic supply, there is no impact on the housing market.  In the 
medium and longer terms however, house prices rise; in the extreme case they simply 
rise by the full 10% of the cost increase.  Rents also rise, by up to 5.7%.  The combined 
effect of an increase in building costs is to reduce the quantity of rented houses by more 
than 1% and the total quantity of houses by more than 1.5%.  The owner-occupancy rate 
falls.  
This model suggests it would be necessary to reduce building costs by 29% in order to 
increase the owner-occupancy rate by 1% in the medium term.  This would have the 
additional effects of lowering rents by 11%, reducing house prices by 22%, increasing the 
quantity of rental accommodation by 3%, and increasing the total quantity of houses by 
4%.  The results in the perfectly elastic case are qualitatively similar, except there is a 
larger change in house prices and a larger increase in the housing stock.  This is the only 
policy that simultaneously reduces rents and house prices, increases the quantity of 
housing and raises owner-occupancy rates. 
6.5  Increase in real interest rates 
The final case corresponds to a 10% increase in mortgage interest rates.  This increases the 
financing costs of home purchase and reduces demand.  In the short run house prices fall 
by 10.6% and rents increase marginally.  This fall is moderated in the medium term, and in 
the case of an infinitely elastic supply of housing there is no price adjustment, but rents 
increase by 6%.  The total quantity of housing declines by more than 1.5% but the owner-
occupancy rate increases.  Higher real interest rates then are typically associated with a 
combination of a fall in house prices, higher rents and a rise in owner-occupancy rates.  
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These figures suggest that to increase the owner-occupancy rate by 1% in the medium 
term, real interest rates would need to increase by 48%.  This would have the additional 
effects of increasing rents by 22%, reducing house prices by 15%, reducing the quantity of 
rental accommodation by 11%, and reducing the total quantity of houses by 8%.  Thus an 
increase in interest rates will raise owner-occupancy rates, but at the expense of sharply 
reducing the quantity of housing. 
In this regard, it is instructive to recall the period from the late 1980s until 2005.  Real 
interest rates fell from over 10% to under 5%; ie, a 50% reduction.  The current model 
predicts that such a change would be accompanied by a substantial increase in real 
house prices, a construction boom, a fall in rents and a drop in home ownership rates.  
These outcomes were exactly those observed over this period.   
Table 3 indicates that the effect of interest rates on the housing market is very different in 
the short run and the long run. In the short run, a decline in interest rates leads to a large 
increase in house prices, and little change in rents, whereas in the medium term and long 
term there is only a small effect on house prices but a large expansion in the quantity of 
housing and a significant decline in rents.  By most welfare metrics except the owner-
occupancy rate, low interest rates are much better for the housing market than high 
interest rates.  The transition from a high interest rate environment to a low interest rate 
environment can be difficult to manage, however, because of the tendency for house 
prices to overshoot in the short run (Coleman and Landon-Lane 2007).  
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7  Sensitivity to changes in the underlying 
assumptions 
To this point the results have been based on the basic set of parameters assumed in 
Table 1.  Inevitably, one never has precise estimates of these parameters.  It is therefore 
prudent to explore the extent to which the results are robust to changes in the underlying 
parameters.  Models of the type developed here are more useful for policy analysis if the 
results hold broadly across a range of possible values for the key parameters.  
The sensitivity of the model’s results to a wide range of parameters was tested.  In order 
to explore a substantial change, we varied five of the key parameters over a wide range, 
assigning four values to each.  We then re-estimated the changes in each of the five 
endogenous variables to each of the five shocks.  In each case we computed the 
responses for the three values of the supply elasticity of housing, corresponding to the 
short, medium and long run cases.   
The results in Section 6 remained remarkably consistent across this extensive range of 
alternative assumptions about the values of the underlying parameters.
10
  For example, 
consider Table 4, which shows the effect of varying the elasticity of the demand for 
housing with respect to rents (denoted
DT
pr ε ) when there is an increase in the tax 
concession to landlords.  As this elasticity varied from -0.05 to -0.40, rents declined by 
between 0.48 and 0.59%; house prices rose by between 0.16 and 0.20%; and there was 
virtually no variation in the change in the number of houses in response to the increased 
tax concessions.  However, in contrast to this robustness, a notable exception was the 
response to changes in the elasticity of supply of rental property with respect to the real 
rate of return to landlords.  This term (denoted as
SR
φ ε ), describes how the quantity of 
rental property supplied by landlords responds to changes in the real rate of return.
11
  To 
illustrate: if the long run real return to investors were to increase from 4% to 5% (a 25% 
increase), and this were to result in a 12.5% increase in the supply of rental property, the 
value of this elasticity would be 0.5 (=12.5/25).   
Table 5 presents the changes in prices and quantities following a 10% increase in the tax 
concession to landlords (raising their overall yield from 5 to 5.15%).  The results are given 
for four values of the elasticity of rental supply with respect to the real pre-tax return to 
investors: 0.25, 0.5, 1.0 and 2.0.  The base case, used in Table 3, is 0.5.   
To illustrate, consider the first block in Table 5 which indicates the amount by which rents 
would fall given a 10% increase in the tax concession to investors.
12
  The top left hand cell 
contains the value -0.17.  This means that if the elasticity of rental supply (denoted
SR
φ ε ) 
were 0.25, and if the pre-tax real return were to be raised by 10% as a result of an 
increase in the tax concessions, rents would fall in the short run by 0.17%.
13
  Looking 
                                                                  
10   Results are available on request.
 
11   Full details of this key elasticity are developed in Appendix B. 
12 
 Alternatively, these results can be read as the amount by which rents would rise if the tax concessions to landlords were 
to be curtailed such that their real pre-tax returns fell by 10%.  This simply involves reversing the sign on the responses 
shown in the body of the table.
 
13   Alternatively, a reduction in the tax concessions would lead to a rise in rents of this amount (ie =0.17%).
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down the same column it will be seen that the quantity of rental units would increase by 
0.66%.  If landlords were very sensitive to their real after-tax returns (
SR
φ ε = 2.0, as in the 
last column of Table 5), a 10% increase in the tax concessions to investors would lead to 
a fall in rents of 0.73% and an expansion in the long run supply of rental properties of 
2.93%. 
Table 4: The responses of prices and quantities in the housing market following a 
10% increase in the tax concession to landlords under a range of values for 
the elasticity of demand for property with respect to the price of rents 
  Elasticity of supply of 
housing with respect to 
price of houses 
(
ST
ph ε ) 
Values of the elasticity of the demand for property with respect to rents 
(
DT
pr ε ) 
-0.05 -0.1  -0.2 
Base case(a) 
-0.4 
% change in 
rents 
0.0 -0.50  -0.41  -0.30  -0.19 
0.5 -0.59  -0.57  -0.54  -0.48 
∞ -0.64  -0.64  -0.64  -0.64 
 
% change in 
house prices 
0.0 0.25  0.40  0.59  0.77 
0.5 0.20  0.19  0.18  0.16 
∞ 0  0  0  0 
 
% change in 
quantity of rental units 
0.0 1.24  1.22  1.19  1.16 
0.5 1.23  1.23  1.25  1.28 
∞ 1.28  1.28  1.28  1.28 
 
% change in 
quantity of total housing 
0.0 0  0  0  0 
0.5 0.10  0.10  0.09  0.08 




0.0 69.63  69.63  69.64  69.66 
0.5 69.66  69.66  69.65  69.64 
∞ 69.63  69.64  69.65  69.69 
(a) The numbers in bold correspond to the values of the base case reported in Table 3, Section B. 
In general these results show that there can be quite significant changes in the relative 
sizes of the responses in prices and quantities as we vary the elasticity of supply of rental 
properties with respect to the return to investors.  In short, much depends on how 
sensitive investors are to changes in after-tax real returns on rental property.  This is 
clearly a critical issue and there has been only limited work in New Zealand on the 
behaviour of investors in rental property (van Zijl de Jong and Scobie 2007).  
WP 09/05  A SIMPLE MODEL OF HOUSING RENTAL AND OWNERSHIP WITH 
POLICY SIMULATIONS  22
 
Table 5:  The responses of prices and quantities in the housing market following a 
10% increase in the tax concession to landlords under a range of values for 
the elasticity of supply of rental housing with respect to the return to 
landlords 
  Elasticity of supply of 
housing with respect to 
price of houses 
(
ST
ph ε ) 
Values of the elasticity of supply of rental property with respect to the 
real pre-tax rate of return to investors (
SR
φ ε ) 
0.25 0.5 
Base case(a)  
1.0 2.0 
% change in 
rents 
0.0 -0.17  -0.33  -0.49  -0.73 
0.5 -0.29  -0.54  -0.92 -1.43 
∞ -0.35  -0.64  -1.11  -1.76 
 
% change in 
house prices 
0.0 0.33  0.59  0.98  1.46 
0.5 0.10  0.18  0.31 0.48 
∞ 0  0  0  0 
 
% change in 
quantity of rental units 
0.0 0.66  1.19  1.97  2.93 
0.5 0.68  1.25  2.14 3.33 
∞ 0.69  1.28  2.22  3.53 
 
% change in 
quantity of total 
housing 
0.0 0  0  0  0 
0.5 0.05  0.09  0.15 0.24 




0.0 69.81  69.64  69.41  69.12 
0.5 69.81  69.65  69.40 69.07 
∞ 69.81  69.66  69.40  69.05 
(a)  The numbers in bold correspond to the values of the base case reported in Table 3, Section B.  
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8 Conclusions 
The complexity of housing markets makes it difficult to draw conclusions about the 
possible impact of public policies in the absence of an analytical framework.  The principal 
objective of this paper has been to provide a framework that is rich enough to capture the 
key characteristics of the housing market, but which is simple enough for everyday use.  
This was done by developing a model of the housing market that captures the essential 
supply and demand elements of both the rental market and the owner-occupancy market, 
and which allows prices and quantities to adjust in response to policy interventions.  The 
model is simple enough to have a straightforward graphical representation, and to be 
solved on a spreadsheet, while sophisticated enough to allow for complex feedback loops.  
The key feature of the model is that it allows both rental and ownership tenure options.  
The interaction between the rental and owner-occupancy segments of the market means 
that prices and quantities in the rental market are determined simultaneously with prices 
and quantities in the owner-occupancy market.  The demand for both classes of property 
includes a household formation effect, an intensification effect (a change in the number of 
people per household), and the substitution between the two market segments.  Because 
of the substitution effect, the rental property demand is much more elastic than total 
housing demand.  
The model can be used to assess the impact of a range of policy interventions in the 
housing market.  A series of policy simulations are presented, based on estimates of the 
underlying parameters.  The simulations investigate the consequence on the housing 
market of five different classes of policy interventions or economic shocks: changes in the 
number of houses, tax concessions to landlords, home-ownership subsidies, construction 
costs, and interest rates.  The model shows how rents, house prices, the number of 
houses and the owner-occupancy ratio are impacted by the changes.  
An important insight stemming from these simulations is that the owner-occupancy rate is 
a very poor measure of the state of the housing market.  The owner-occupancy rate could 
be increased by 1% by any one of the following policies: the government could build (and 
sell) 375,000 houses; construction costs could fall by 29%, real interest rates could 
increase by 48%; the government could reduce the tax concession available to landlords 
by 29%, or approximately $1,200 per property; or the government could increase the 
subsidy to owner-occupiers by 53% or approximately $2,500 per household. 
The first three of these changes represent enormous interventions.  However, they are 
large not because these interventions have little effect on the housing market but because 
they change the incentives facing landlords and homeowners in the same way, so induce 
only minor changes in the owner-occupancy ratio.  For example, the reduction in 
construction costs that increases the owner-occupancy rate by 1% lowers house prices by 
22%, rents by 11% and increases the quantity of houses by 4%; the change in interest 
rates that has the same effect on the owner-occupancy rate lowers house prices by 15% 
but raises rents by 22% and reduces the quantity of housing by 8%.  In these cases the 
owner-occupancy rate says little about the overall state of the housing market.  Clearly the 
former change has better housing market outcomes than the latter.   
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Even in the case that a policy intervention has a direct effect on the incentives facing 
landlords or homeowners, the owner-occupancy rate is a poor measure of the state of the 
housing market.  For example, a rise in the owner-occupancy rate can be induced by 
either an increase in the tax on landlords or an increase in the subsidy for home-owners.  
The former raises rents, lowers house prices and reduces the quantity of housing; the 
latter lowers rents, raises house prices and increases the quantity of housing.  The 
distributional implications for those who rent and those who already own homes are 
clearly different, yet the effect on the owner-occupancy rate is the same.  Part of the 
problem is that the owner-occupancy rate largely misses the way that households 
endogenously form or dissolve in response to changes in rents and house prices.  
Overall owner-occupancy rates can fall even if the number of young households owning 
their own home increases.  This is because household formation can change in response 
to lower rents.  There may be more couples deciding to split up because they can afford to 
live separately (with at least one renting).  Young people and students may leave home 
earlier than otherwise and rent.  Flats of four people may form two flats of two people, or 
flats of two people may choose to live as singles.  All of this increases the number of 
renting households and improves welfare, without decreasing the number of people 
owning their own home.  Hence as more households form the owner-occupier rate may 
fall, merely because of greater numbers of people choosing to rent.  This result carries no 
implication that overall welfare was lower, and highlights the need for caution when using 
the owner-occupancy rate as either a target for, or an indicator of public policy in the 
housing sector. 
The model suggests that in the medium term the largest effect on housing affordability 
would result from either lowering construction costs or reducing real interest rates.  A 10% 
reduction in either would increase the quantity of housing by 1.5%, and lower rents by 4%.  
Both would reduce the financing cost of owning a house by 7%, although in the event that 
real interest rates declined, house prices would rise and owner-occupancy rates would 
fall.  
Both changes are feasible.  First, real construction costs were at record levels in 2007 as 
a result of a construction boom.  It therefore seems likely they could fall as demand 
pressures ease.  Furthermore, current policy initiatives could well reduce some elements 
of the various regulatory and compliance costs.  In addition, for the last two decades New 
Zealand has had some of the highest real interest rates in the world.  Were 
New Zealanders able to borrow at real interest rates closer to world averages, housing 
affordability could improve by an amount that would dwarf any likely effect of interventions 
that subsidise owner-occupancy.  
Two critical factors influence the success of any intervention in the housing market.   
These are the responsiveness of the supply of rental property to the rate of return to 
investors, and the responsiveness of the construction sector to house prices.  Rents, 
house prices and the quantity of rental units are all much more responsive to a change in 
the investor returns when the supply elasticity of rental property with respect to returns is 
higher rather than lower.  Unfortunately, little is known about this parameter, or the factors 
that influence entry and exit of investors into the residential property market.  The 
importance of this parameter in the model suggests that it is a prime topic for further 
research.  
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The model also shows that the way demand conditions effect house prices depends 
critically on the elasticity of the total supply of housing with respect to prices.  This 
underscores the importance of regulatory and consent procedures that facilitate rather 
than hinder the growth of the housing stock.  The speed that housing supply responds to 
demand shocks is particularly important in an environment where demand shocks such as 
changes in interest rates or migration inflows and outflows are common.  If the supply of 
housing responds only slowly to demand shocks, price bubbles may occur, resulting in 
exaggerated swings in the housing market. 
The tractability of the model required some simplifying assumptions.  The model treats the 
housing market as a national integrated market of houses of uniform quality and thus 
makes no allowance for regional patterns.  Nor does it explicitly address differences in the 
quality of housing.  To the extent that regional markets and the markets for houses of 
varying quality are linked, this is not as serious a limitation as might first appear.  A 
change in one part of the market will have flow through effects on other regions.  In regard 
to quality, the quantity supplied and demanded can be thought of as applying to 
standardised housing units that have incorporated an adjustment for quality.   
A second limitation is that the model is purely static.  It allows us to consider the market 
with or without a change in taxes, for example, but is silent on the adjustment path from 
the existing to the new position.  As it focuses on the fundamental drivers of the housing 
market, it abstracts from the role played by expectations in determining house prices in 
the short run.  This is quite appropriate when choosing between different long run housing 
policies.  In this case, the short run dynamics are of less concern.  Nonetheless, there is 
considerable evidence that house prices fluctuate excessively in the short run because 
price expectations in housing markets are not fully rational.  For this reason, it may be 
worth adding dynamic elements to the model to enhance its capacity to track short run 
movements in house prices.    
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Signs of the elasticities 
This appendix sets out the predicted signs of the elasticities of rents ()
R P  and house 
prices ()
H P  with respect to the five exogenous variables: income () Y , taxes () t , interest 
rate () r , subsidies () τ  and construction costs () C .  
Consider the matrix () p E from equation (4).  Given our assumptions,  
() ()
()
QP S R D R Q S R D R
pr pr ph ph
p PD T S T D T
pr ph ph
E







⎢ ⎥ ++ ⎣ ⎦
and det( ) p E  is positive.  
It follows that  
1 () () 1
() det( )
ST DT Q SR DR
ph ph ph ph
p PD T Q P S R D R




αε αα ε ε
− ⎡⎤ −−−
= ⎢⎥
+− ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦  
has signs 
++ ⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥ −+ ⎣ ⎦
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Appendix B: Derivation of the values of key elasticities 
(1) The elasticity of supply of rental property 
(a) Preliminaries 
The first step in calculating the elasticity of supply of rental property with respect to rents, 
house prices, and taxes is to calculate how the supply of rental property varies with the 
pre-tax real rate of return.  The pre-tax rate of return depends on the rent (after costs such 
as insurance and rates), the capital appreciation on a property, and the tax arrangements.  
We define a pre-tax-equivalent return for a particular after-tax return as the pre-tax return 
that would generate that after-tax return if income tax were paid on the full return.  This is 
derived below. 
Let: 
H P  = the price of a rental house; 
R P  = the rent on a leased house; 
rR H p PP = = rent as a fraction of the house price; 
π   =  the rate of property appreciation, which is untaxed; 
m  = the income tax rate; 
t   = the pre-tax value of the tax concession of not taxing property appreciation; 
Φ   = annual pre-tax equivalent return from owning a rental property, in dollars;  
φ  = annual pre-tax equivalent return from owning a rental property, in percentage terms. 
The after-tax return to a property investment is 
[( 1 ) ]
rH p mP π −+  
Let   (1 ) tm m π =−  be the pre-tax value of the tax concession that comes from not taxing 
the capital appreciation on property.  Then  
[ ( 1)] [ ] ( 1)
rH r H p mPp t m P ππ −+ = + + −  (B.1) 







⎡⎤ Φ= + + ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ =+ + ⎣⎦  (B.2) 
Currently in New Zealand,  0.035
r p ≈  ,  0.03 π ≈ ,  0.33 m = , and  0.015 t ≈ .  Thus the total 
pre-tax nominal return is approximately 8% (0.035 0.03 0.015) ++  and the pre-tax real 
return is approximately 5% (8 ) π − .   
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.  This is the key elasticity from which the others are calculated.  Our 
baseline assumption is that  0.5
SR
φ ε = .  This means, for example, that a one percentage 
point increase in the real rate of return from 5 to 6% increases the quantity of rentals by 
10%.  We judge that a reasonable range for this parameter is 0.25 1
SR
φ ε ≤≤ , implying a 
one percentage point increase in the expected real rate of return raises the quantity of 
rentals by between 5 and 20%. 
(b) The elasticities of rental supply with respect to various prices 
(i) Elasticity of rental supply with respect to rent  
The elasticity with respect to the rent 
R P  is calculated as follows:  
1
.. . . .
RR R R R R r
SR SR
pr RR RR H R
QP Q P Q P p







∂∂ ∂∂  (B.3) 
In the above parameterization,  0.035
r p =  and  0.05 φ = , so  0.7
SR sr
pr φ εε ≈ . 
(ii) Elasticity of rental supply with respect to tax 





Qt Q t Q tt







∂∂ ∂ ∂  (B.4) 
In the above parameterization,  0.015 t ≈  and  0.05 φ = , so  0.3
SR SR
t φ εε ≈ . 
(iii) Elasticity of rental supply with respect to interest rates 
We assume that the elasticity with respect to interest rates is equal but opposite in sign to 
the elasticity with respect to the rate of return on property: 
SR SR
r φ εε =− . 
(iv) Elasticity of rental supply with respect to house prices 
The elasticity of rental supply with respect to house prices is complicated.  For a given 
rental income, an increase in house prices lowers the rate of return.  However, if the 
property continues to appreciate at the inflation rate π, a 1% increase in house prices will 
not lead to a 1% decrease in the total rate of return.  Rather, the total return will have only 
decreased by the ratio 
r p φ : 
.. .
RH R H r
SR SR
ph HR R H







== = − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠  (B.5) 
as  ()
RH PP t φπ =+ + and so 
2 ()
H RH r H P PP p P φ ∂ ∂ =− =− .  
In the above parameterization,  0.035
r p =  and  0.05 φ = , so  0.7
SR SR
ph φ εε ≈− .  
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(2) The elasticity of demand to rent or own property for own use 
(a) Preliminaries 
We assume that the total demand for housing and the demand to live in rental housing 
depend on the rent charged and the after-subsidy cost of financing the purchase of a house, 
* h P .  The latter can be thought of as the annual opportunity cost of purchasing a house at a 
price P
H ; this is 
* (1 )





DR R R h
DT T R h
QD P P X
QD P P X
=
=  (B.6) 
The key parameters to estimate that correspond to the first equation are the elasticity of 
the demand to rent housing with respect to the price of rent and the elasticity of the 
demand to rent housing with respect to the finance cost of housing.  
Denote the elasticity of the demand to rent with respect to the financing cost of housing 
* h P as  *
DR
ph ε .  The elasticities with respect to τ , r , and 





































∂∂ ∂  (B.9) 
A similar derivation holds for the elasticities of the total demand for housing with respect to 
home-ownership subsidies, interest rates, and house prices.  
 (b) Subsidies to home ownership 
The main subsidy or tax concession to home ownership in New Zealand occurs because 
imputed rent is not taxed, whereas interest and dividends from other sorts of capital are 
taxed.  If one owns capital and is choosing whether to (a) rent a property and invest in 
interest and dividend earning assets or (b) purchase a property to live in, there is an 
incentive to purchase a property to live in because the imputed rent is not taxed.  The 
subsidy in this case is the average tax rate on capital income.  If one does not own capital 
and must borrow the purchase price, there is no advantage.  The extent of the subsidy 
therefore depends on the extent to which property is owned outright.  
We use a value of  1/6 τ = .  This is calculated by averaging the value of the subsidy 
across three groups: the third of households that own a house without a mortgage, the 
third of households that own a house with a mortgage, and the third of households that 
rent.
14
  In each case, we assume the average tax rate on capital income is 0.30.  
                                                                  
14   Even though people who rent are not taking advantage of the subsidy, the subsidy affects their decision of whether to 
rent or buy. We include in this calculation the value of the subsidy to renters if they were to purchase.
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The first group is easiest to calculate, as they get the full tax concession.  The tax 
concession for the other groups depends on the capital they have to contribute to the 
purchase of a house.  We assume the average mortgage is half the value of the property 
for the group that has mortgages, and the average mortgage would be 90% of the value of 
the property for those that do not.  This implies a value for 
0.30*1/3(1+0.5+0.1) = 0.16 τ = .  We round this to 1/6.  We use the same parameter in 
the equation for the total demand for housing.  
(c) Demand elasticities with respect to rent and housing finance costs   
The data in Tables B.1 and B.2 summarise the evolution of property prices, rents, and the 
quantity of properties in New Zealand since 1991. The population figures and number of 
houses come from the census while the price and interest rate data are from the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand.  The interest rate is the average mortgage rate adjusted for the 
inflation rate.
15
  The data refer to the March quarter of each census year. 
The raw data are in Table B.1.  In Table B.2, two adjustments are made to these data to 
aid comparability between years.  First, the prices of houses and rents are deflated by the 
consumer price index.  Second, the quantity of houses is adjusted for population.  This is 
done by multiplying the number of houses in an earlier year t by the ratio of the 2006 
population to the population in year t.  Thus the table shows the number of houses that 
would have existed if the country had the 2006 population but same per capita ratios of 
houses. 
The data show that on a per capita basis the total number of houses increased by only 4% 
over the 15 year period.  The number of rental units increased by 23%.  Almost all of the 
latter increase took place between 1996 and 2001.  During this period real house prices 
increased by 110%, while real mortgage rates declined by 60% .  Thus the real financing 
cost of purchasing a house declined by 44% between 1991 and 2001 before increasing by 
53% between 2001 and 2006.  The fact that there was almost no change in the per capita 
quantity of houses demanded over the fifteen years despite these enormous variations in 
house prices and interest rates suggests that the elasticity of total housing demand with 
respect to the price of housing must be very small – probably less than 0.1.  
The data appear to be more informative about the effect of rents on the demand for rental 
property.  Between 1996 and 2001 there was almost no change in real house prices, but a 
9% decrease in real rents.  Real mortgage rates declined from 8 to 5%, making home 
ownership somewhat more attractive.  During this period the total number of houses 
(normalized for population) increased by 2%, while the number of rental houses increased 
19%.  If the main factor affecting the housing market was the 9% decrease in rents, the 
elasticity of rental houses with respect to rents would be 19/ ( 9) 2 −≈ −  while the total 
elasticity with respect to rents would be 2/( 9) 0.2 −≈ − .  Of course, as noted above, other 
things such as interest rates did change; however, they changed in a direction that would 
have made renting less attractive, suggesting these ballpark figures could underestimate 
the true elasticity.  
                                                                  
15  
The inflation rate is the average change in the CPI from the March quarter of the preceding year to the March quarter of 
the subsequent year.   
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On the basis of the aggregate movements in house prices, rents, and housing quantities, 
it seems reasonable to postulate that  2
SR
pr ε ≈− ,  0.2
ST
pr ε ≈− .  The total demand elasticities 
are much more difficult to guess, given that the total quantity of houses per capita 
increased by about 1% every five years, despite a wide variation in house prices and 
interest rates.  Nonetheless, these data are suggestive that the total demand elasticity 
with respect to house prices is small, perhaps -0.02 to -0.10.  
























‘000 Index  1995=1000  % 
1991 3,488  267  1177  924  808  812  11.7 
1996  3,723 290  1268 1012 1069 1122  8.0 
2001  3,876 359  1344 1091 1045 1212  5.2 
2006  4,134 388  1454 1237 1173 2295  4.8 
Source:  Statistics New Zealand Census of Populations and Dwellings 





Number of Houses normalized to the 











Real indices 1995 =1000 
1991 316  1395 874  878  1444 
1996 322  1408 1056  1108  1249 
2001 383  1433 958  1111  809 
2006 388  1454 949  1855  1238 
Source:  Statistics New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings; Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
(d) Trends in household formation and household size 
An important feature of the New Zealand housing market in the last forty years has been 
the declining size of the average household.  The average number of people in each 
house declined steadily from 3.8 to 2.96 from 1966 to 1991, or by 1% per year.  It declined 
a little further between 1991 and 2006 to 2.84.  Several factors have been behind this 
trend.  Amongst these has been a sharp decline in the average size of households with 
children, most notably a sharp decline in the number of families with three or more 
children.  Between 1966 and 1991, the fraction of households with five or more people 
declined from 28 to 13%.  Secondly, there has been a big increase in the number of 
households comprising a single person or a couple.  Trends in the fraction of households 
of different size are shown in Table B.3.  
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Table B.3: Distribution of households by size  
  1 person  2 people  1or 2 people  3-4 people  5+people 
1966  12.5% 24.8% 37.3% 34.9% 27.8% 
1971  14.1% 26.4% 40.5% 34.2% 25.3% 
1976  15.6% 27.9% 43.5% 34.6% 21.9% 
1981  18.4% 29.2% 47.7% 34.5% 17.8% 
1986  19.4% 30.5% 50.0% 34.8% 15.2% 
1991  20.2% 32.7% 52.9% 33.9% 13.2% 
1996  20.8% 33.1% 54.0% 32.9% 13.1% 
2001  22.9% 33.7% 56.6% 31.5% 12.0% 
Source:  Statistics New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 
Changes in the average size of a household are a key aspect of the model, for total 
demand for housing changes in response to variation in rents and house prices only 
through changes in household formation.  Excluding changes in the average size of a 
household that stem from a reduction in the average number of children, there are several 
ways that household formation might respond to prices:  
•  older children change the time they leave their parents’ home; 
•  the number of people living in households comprising unrelated people changes; in 
particular the number of people deciding to live by themselves as individuals or couples 
changes; 
•  the number of families choosing to split up and form two households changes;  
•  the number of families deciding to live in multiple family households changes; and 
•  the number of older people choosing to move in with their children or into institutional 
housing changes. 
Aggregate census data suggest that the rising number of single households has been the 
most important factor since 1991.  As Table B.4 indicates, there have only been small 
changes in the number of multiple family households and the number of “unrelated 
people” households.  It is not clear why the total number of single family (including solo 
parent and couples) households has been declining, although the decline has been driven 
by falling numbers of households with four or more people.  
Table B.4 Distribution of households by type 
  1986 1991 1996 2001 
Single  18.5% 20.2% 20.2% 22.9% 
1 family  73.3% 72.2% 69.6% 67.6% 
2-3 families  1.5% 1.7% 2.7% 2.1% 
unrelated people  5.9% 5.9% 5.2% 5.2% 
Total   1,078,005 1,166,568 1,268,094 1,344,267 
Source:  Statistics New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 